Welcome to Applied Cyber!

Stanford Admit Weekend

April 26, 2024

Aditya Saligrama

President || saligrama@stanford.edu
CS ‘24, MS CS ‘25 (Systems/Security)

Cody Ho

Vice President || codyho@
Symsys ‘24, MS CS ‘25 (AI)

Yasmine Mitchell

Financial Officer || yasminem@
CS ‘23, MS CS ‘24 (Systems/Security)

Donovan Jasper

Competitions Lead || djasper@
CS (Systems) & Music ‘25

Nathan Bhak

Projects Lead || nbhak@
CS ‘23, MS CS ‘24 (Systems/Security)

Jay Park

Women in Applied Cyber Lead || jaehpark@
CS ‘24, MS CS ‘25 (Systems/Security)

About Applied Cyber

Competitions:
Offense & Defense

Projects & Events

STANFORD SECURITY CLINIC



We also really like to hack stuff...


THE MOON
IS
FLAT

Why care about security?

Case study: Stanford Link (2020)

- *Match with your crush if they like you back*
- *Website keeps you anonymous if they don't*
- ***What could go wrong?***

Case study: Stanford Link (2020)



The Stanford Daily

News • Campus Life

Vulnerability in 'Link' website may have exposed data on Stanford students' crushes

What’s old is new again: Stanford Reveal (2023)




```
44    {
45      "submittingUserFullName": "Aditya Saligrama",
46      "user": "4yz2FPyYDgND8KhtVOQLCeeGsaq2",
47      "submittingUserEmail": "akps@stanford.edu",
48      "fullNames": []
49    },
```

```
231   {
232     "submittingUserEmail": "mccain@stanford.edu",
233     "submittingUserFullName": "Robert Miles Redd McCain",
234     "user": "N3Q9CkeKeJfKQzOhqt7qFbpanat1",
235     "fullNames": [
236       "isabelle levent"
237     ]
238   },
```

A Quick Note on the Web

Our Internet Abstraction



HTTP: the missing language of the web



Session Handling: *How does a website remember?*



- ***Cookies!***
- Cookies enable web servers to store stateful information in your browser
- Authentication cookies are used to authenticate that a user is logged in, and with which account
  - On login: **`Set-Cookie: session=session-id`**

Common insecure design patterns

CatShare

https://catshare.saligrama.io



We're a real startup!

Vulnerabilities

- Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)
- Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
- Improper Session Handling

Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)

Or: asking the server for the resources you want



IDOR case study I: Parler (2021)

- IDOR vulnerability leads to leakage of 70TB of user data

- Why?
  - Poor engineering
  - Lack of testing

Source: https://cybernews.com/news/70tb-of-parler-users-messages-videos-and-posts-leaked-by-security-researchers/

TRY IT!

- The CatShare team has a website https://catshare.saligrama.io/ that **stores personal information**
- There's an endpoint https://catshare.saligrama.io/user to access this info
  - e.g. https://catshare.saligrama.io/user?id=test
- CatShare claims this is secure and only accessible to admins
- **Show us otherwise**

IDOR case study II: Stanford Marriage Pact (2020)

We told you we couldn't leave you empty handed tonight. Well, here's a gift from to thank you for your patience. A token of our gratitude, to let you know *just* how special you are.

👇 **Check it out** 👇

Gimme my 🔥Hot Takes🔥

Two more days until the end of Week 10—and one more day until the matches come out. When that happens, we want to help make sure as many people get matched as possible, so...

The questionnaire is open for another 7.2 hours, until 4pm PST later today. Text your friends, bug your enemies. They may not be *your* perfect match, but they could be someone else's. The bigger the pool, the better everyone's matches become.

Thanks again for your patience. We'll see you this evening for the match announcement.

Love,
The Stanford Marriage Pact

IDOR case study II: Stanford Marriage Pact (2020)

https://mp.com/**29d2223b196d87e8e9292308c074e593**



29d2223b196d87e8e9292308c074e593

saligrama@stanford.edu

yasminem@stanford.edu

7b58812708b7976e77d94c0130e17fbe

https://mp.com/7b58812708b7976e77d94c0130e17fbe

Avoiding IDOR

- Ensure that a user is allowed to access a resource before returning it

- If not possible (e.g. cloud storage buckets), then make resource URIs random and unpredictable. Avoid:
  - Automatically incrementing resource IDs
  - Hashing a guessable property such as usernames, phone numbers, or emails

- Instead: use random identifiers such as UUIDs

Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

- XSS attacks enable attackers to hijack your website to **run JavaScript code** on other users' browsers

- They occur when **user input is not properly sanitized and displayed**, allowing it to execute as code

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

GET /myfeed



```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<body>

<b>Donovan says:</b>
<script>
     alert("You got hacked!");
</script>

</body>
</html>
```

www.yourwebsite.com/law/<?StealAllTheData.js>/supersecretdata

Reflected XSS





https://vulnerable.website/search?query=<script>alert("pwned")</script>

Stored XSS


02-14-2018, 08:52 PM
readernick
On the Ice
Join Date: Dec 2015
Posts: 498
Delete
02-14-2018, 09:43 PM
fleeting
Queen Anissina
[wrong thread oops 😎]


Title
http://website.com
Bad code,
sent as text
Server stores things
in the database
Bad code
is **stored** in
the database
Title
http://website.com
Just a regular
request...
Server gets things
from the database
Bad code
runs in the browser!

TRY IT!

- After our last data breach, we at CatShare want to make our customers feel like we care about them

- We added an endpoint https://catshare.saligrama.io/hello that takes a user's name and greets them kindly. Ya know, to show we care
  - e.g. https://catshare.saligrama.io/hello?name=User1

- We think this is harmless and will only build customer trust. **Show us our mistake.**

Improper session handling

Cookie itself is insecure

- Can modify cookie to access another's account
  - e.g. become admin

Cookie not checked for authorization

- Use your own account to
  - Impersonate someone else
  - Escalate privileges to admin

TRY IT!

- CatShare added an `admin view` to https://catshare.saligrama.io/login for admins to `view user data`

- Log in using `stanford:stanford`

- Can you become `admin` and view the user data?

TRY IT!

TOOLS/REFERENCE

- Cookie is in Base64 format
  - Transforms data into a mix of letters and numbers.
  - Doesn't actually secure or encrypt data; it's just a different way to show it.
  - Use https://kk.lol to encode/decode
- Your browser's Developer Tools
  - Accessible from Inspect Element



What to look for is in red (logged in as aditya here)

- https://catshare.saligrama.io/login
  - Login with stanford:stanford

Session handling case study: Kontra (2022)



Session handling case study: Kontra (2022)



Session handling case study: Kontra (2022)

Request

Pretty Raw Hex

```
1 POST /prod/users/ae697870-3e71-4a0e-bd5e-5ea501a62dd0/topics/suggestions HTTP/2
2 Host: api.dissonantchat.com
3 Accept: application/json
4 Content-Type: multipart/form-data
5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
6 Content-Length: 136
7 User-Agent: kontra/1.0.0 CFNetwork/1240.0.4 Darwin/20.6.0
8 Accept-Language: en-us
9 Authorization:
  eyJraWQiOiJXd1ZodEk2a2RnazVsdnVGMXZxV2E1aXEyTjRmOFJpaDh1dFczOEM4K2o0PSIsImFsZyI6IlJTMjU2In0.ey
  JzdWIiOiI1YjY1MjMzOS1hODU3LTQ3ZTctOTkwYy1lMWI1MWRlNjg3NTMiLCJlbWFpbF92ZXJpZmllZCI6dHJ1ZSwiY3Vz
  dG9tOmRiVXNlcklkIjoiZjM2NzBmZDMtNjQ2MS00OWEzLTk0OTEtMDdkZTJlZmJkNDMyIiwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6XC9cL2
  NvZ25pdG8taWRwLnVzLXdlc3QtMi5hbWF6b25hd3MuY29tXC91cy13ZXN0LTJfN0lwcTViYWw3IiwiY29nbml0bzp1c2Vy
  bmFtZSI6InR3ZWVkbGVkZWUiLCJnaXZlbl9uYW1lIjoiVHdlZWRsZSIsImF1ZCI6Ijdhb2tyOGtqYWFmcGgzY3BvbHJtdT
  c4MjkyIiwiZXZlbnRfaWQiOiIwNDdjNGRlNC00YzM3LTQwNzYtODRkNS1jYTUxNjVmM2NjY2IiLCJ0b2tlbl91c2UiOiJp
  ZCIsImF1dGhfdGltZSI6MTY1MTM2MTI4NywiZXhwIjoxNjUxMzY0ODg3LCJpYXQiOjE2NTEzNjEyODcsImZhbWlseV9uYW
  1lIjoiRGVlIiwiZW1haWwiOiJ0d2VlZGxlZGVlQHNhbGlncmFtYS5pbyJ9.dsWbgWFAl_hAK0WE3mO88jKlkUbhDA5Uw2a
  ICYqUKwPRrusLHujmYoZmQcjIhQtpyx05diU9cMM9dDI7oA-g6rx8sll-lAdU--R-n4_IG1V4mNUnHNLyossg2rBZHY_yH
  ousS9uAqMvKL5MeGf1Vo8z6B9_8k1hxLIlg1wtRo8eqLmiGYKxftSC4y1gafZjLIrCxl6nphrFGMhllRBOoCmYx674v2cz
  Ik9AMMXNZZe8Up7lvT8gpucpty1MNLFGnd2N4she2c5xajMouuC1b3aPlW-3Br4TYct9DkGfSG80wLBzgcIFVzZdaoJWwX
  VBy8GqOvuAN56SDWRXZRLaxqA
10
11 {
     "topicsuggestion":
     "This is a test poll submitted by @tweedledee pretending to be @tweedledum",
     "userconsent":true,
     "topicinterest":"Yes"
   }
```

Tweedledum's UUID

Tweedledee's Authorization header

Tweedledee's desired poll content

Response

Pretty Raw Hex Render

```
1 HTTP/2 200 OK
2 Date: Sat, 30 Apr 2022 23:31:22 GMT
3 Content-Type: application/json
4 Content-Length: 2
5 X-Amzn-Requestid: e4d43f4e-ae61-46be-a8ef-7ee85d32b711
6 X-Amz-Apigw-Id: Rav_pFhXPHcFc2w=
7 X-Amzn-Trace-Id: Root=1-626dc6ca-1155462368d318260056d370;Sampled=0
8
9 {
  }
```

Session handling case study: Kontra (2022)

Avoiding improper session handling

Before taking a sensitive action:

Check the user is who they say they are

And that they are allowed to perform the action

Misconfigured Firebase security rules



Clients can directly access the database
(including malicious clients!)

- Database is in charge of validating user access to data
- Poor validation (e.g. misconfigured rules) → unauthorized data access

Case study: Fizz (2021)

Opinions

Opinion | Fizz previously compromised its users' privacy. It may do so again.

Fizz had a large data vulnerability discovered last fall. Their response raises questions about the app today.
(Graphic: JOYCE CHEN/The Stanford Daily)

Opinion by Joyce Chen
Nov. 1, 2022, 10:00 p.m.

Case study: Fizz (2021)

Users

Posts

Case study: Fizz (2021)

Users

Posts





Wrap-up

Nothing is 100% secure

Applied Cyber helps out startups!



https://securityclinic.org

Security courses at Stanford

- *INTLPOL 268*: Hack Lab
- *CS 155*: Computer and Network Security
- *CS 152*: Trust and Safety Engineering
- *CS 255*: Cryptography
- *CS 153*: Applied Security at Scale
- *INTLPOL 268D*: Online Open Source Investigation
- *CS 40*: Cloud Infrastructure and Scalable Application Deployment

Q&A: Security @ Stanford